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Climate Change and the Duties of the Disadvantaged: Reply to Caney 
 
Carl Knight* 
 
Abstract: Discussions of where the costs of climate change adaptation and mitigation 
should fall often focus on the ‘polluter pays principle’ or the ‘ability to pay principle’. 
Simon Caney has recently defended a ‘hybrid view’, which includes versions of both of 
these principles. This article argues that Caney’s view succeeds in overcoming several 
shortfalls of both principles, but is nevertheless subject to three important objections: 
first, it does not distinguish between those emissions which are hard to avoid and those 
which are easy to avoid; second, its only partial reference to all-things-considered justice 
means it cannot provide a full account even of climate justice; and third, it assigns to the 
poor very limited duties to meet climate change costs, even where they have created those 
costs, which may incentivise them to increase emissions. An alternative pluralistic 
account which avoids these objections is presented.   
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Climate Change and the Duties of the Disadvantaged: Reply to Caney 
 
1. Introduction 
Significant measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change need to be taken if the most 
severe of its harmful effects are to be prevented. But where should the costs of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation fall? In a recent article in this journal, entitled ‘Climate 
Change and the Duties of the Advantaged’, Simon Caney has sought to answer this 
question, defending what he calls a ‘hybrid view’.1 This view is of special interest 
because, as the name suggests, it appeals to several independently weighty moral 
considerations, giving particularly prominent roles to historical responsibility for 
pollution and current ability to pay. 
In this article I argue that, despite its evident appeal, Caney’s hybrid view has its 
own weaknesses. Its treatment of disadvantaged persons and their duties is especially 
problematic. The hybrid view’s indifference to the circumstances polluters face and only 
partial reference to wider justice issues leaves some polluters unduly disadvantaged by 
harsh duties. Perhaps the biggest problem is that the very disadvantaged – the global poor 
– have very limited duties of climate justice on the hybrid view. Such weaknesses are 
absent from an alternative, equally pluralistic approach to assigning the costs of climate 
change-induced harm, which I simply call ‘the pluralistic account’. 
 I start by describing the ‘polluter pays principle’ and ‘ability to pay principle’, and 
show how they are brought together attractively in Caney’s hybrid view (section 2). I 
                                                 
1 Caney 2010. Parenthetical references in the text refer to this article. For an earlier presentation of the 
hybrid view see Caney 2005. 
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then offer three objections to Caney’s position, under the headings ‘the disadvantaged 
polluter’, ‘the disadvantaged saint’, and the ‘license to pollute’ (sections 3-5). Towards 
the end of the paper I present my preferred pluralistic account, and show that it is not 
subject to the four objections (section 6-8).   
 
2. Polluter pays, ability to pay, and the hybrid view  
One well known account of where the costs of climate change abatement should fall is 
the polluter pays principle (PPP), which holds (roughly) that those agents who have 
created harmful climate change are responsible for the full cost of its abatement (204).2 
In both academic discussions and in international negotiations, where developing 
countries such as Brazil have favoured the principle, the relevant agents are usually 
treated as states (205-6). But a more plausible interpretation of PPP says that individuals 
should pay for the costs of harmful climate change in proportion to their contribution.3 
As Caney notes, PPP has several limitations (210-13). Some portion of climate 
change does not derive from human action, or is attributable to persons who to the dead, 
and in such cases there is no polluter who can pay. In addition, some persons could only 
satisfy their duties under PPP by driving themselves below a decent standard of living, 
and it is often supposed that this generates an asymmetry between rich countries, who 
must abate climate change, and poor countries, who are allowed ‘subsistence emissions’.4 
                                                 
2 Shue 1999; Neumayer 2000. 
3 Caney suggests that corporations, sub-statal political authorities, and international financial institutions 
should also be subject to PPP (219-20; cf. Caney 2005). 
4 Shue 1993; 1995. 
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Recognizing these limitations, Caney’s favoured version of PPP, which we may 
distinguish as ‘PPP*’, not only leaves aside non-human and previous generation climate 
change costs but also those caused by the poor:  
 
Persons should bear the burden of climate change that they have caused so long as 
doing so does not push them beneath a decent standard of living (PPP*) (218). 
 
Caney proposes a ‘history-sensitive’ variant of the ability to pay principle (ATP) 
to deal with the ‘remainder’: that is, to assign climate change mitigation and adaptation 
costs necessitated by nature, previous generations, or the global poor.5 ATP simply states 
that costs of mitigation and adaptation should be met by the wealthy, in proportion to 
their wealth (204, 213). Caney’s preferred variant of ATP, which he calls ‘ATP**’, states 
that costs of mitigation and adaptation should be met by the wealthy, in proportion to 
their wealth, but also assigns greater responsibilities to abate global warming to those 
whose wealth has been generated unjustly, in this generation or previous ones: 
 
The duties to bear the Remainder should be borne by the wealthy but we should 
distinguish between two groups - (i) those whose wealth came about in unjust 
ways, and (ii) those whose wealth did not come about in unjust ways – and we 
should apportion greater responsibility to (i) than to (ii) (ATP**) (218). 
 
                                                 
5 See Shue 1999, 537-40; Moellendorf 2002, pp. 97-100. 
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 Caney’s approach to distributing the costs of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, which he calls the ‘hybrid view’, consists of PPP* and ATP** arranged in 
lexical order, PPP* being applied first, and ATP** being applied only to the remainder 
left by PPP*. 
PPP* and ATP** together form an attractive account of assigning climate change 
costs. PPP* introduces a strong element of ‘responsibility sensitivity’ while both PPP* 
and ATP** introduce a strong concern with the fairness of the distributive pattern: PPP* 
excuses the worst off from paying for their pollution, thereby advantaging them, while 
ATP** assigns remaining costs to wealthier persons, again benefiting the disadvantaged. 
The main weakness of PPP* can be seen as being overcome by the addition of ATP** to 
handle the otherwise problematic remainder while the main weakness of ATP – its 
indifference to historical responsibility for climate change – is addressed by the move to 
ATP** and the lexical priority given to PPP*.  
The real strength of Caney’s view is these complementary characters of PPP* and 
ATP**.6 But the view is not without its problems. In each of the next three sections I 
present a criticism of the hybrid view, the overall focus being on its treatment of 
disadvantage. 
 
3. The disadvantaged polluter 
PPP* is indifferent to disadvantage above the threshold of poverty. This may seem a 
strength when we compare polluters to otherwise similarly positioned non-polluters, for 
(at least above Caney’s poverty threshold) it may seem reasonable to hold polluters to 
account for acting in harmful ways that non-polluters have declined. But polluters are not 
                                                 
6 See Jagers and Duus-Otterström 2008. 
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always making their decisions from relevantly similar circumstances to non-polluters. For 
instance, it is unreasonable to expect people in very cold countries to spend similar 
amounts on heating as people in temperate regions, and unjust to make them carry the full 
burden of their excess carbon emissions.7 
There is a relation of the foregoing argument that may appeal even to the 
committed environmentalist who denies that big polluters should ever be subsidised by 
(relative) non-polluters. Among polluters there will be those who do so out of necessity 
(for warmth, say, or to produce drinking water in arid countries), and those who do not 
(perhaps they like powerful cars and the jetset lifestyle). Surely it is unfair to make these 
two groups pay the same for each kilo of carbon they emit. The first group are victims of 
circumstance, while the latter are simply indulgent consumers.  
In the course of defending his approach to human rights against climate change-
induced harms, Caney recognizes the distinction between fundamental interests and 
luxuries as morally weighty.8 His account of assigning the costs of climate change would 
benefit from recognizing a similar distinction.  
 
4. The disadvantaged saint 
PPP* assigns climate change costs to polluters, rather than to the unjust in general. This 
generates the unacceptable result that someone who pollutes moderately and otherwise 
leads a life devoted to realising the ends of justice will face a greater liability than 
                                                 
7 Caney 2009 cites Neumayer 2004 on this point while criticizing Agarwal and Narain 1991’s suggestion 
that each individual should be allowed equal emissions, but he does not seem to have taken it into account 
in his own position on assigning costs. 
8 Caney 2006, 262-3. 
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someone who pollutes slightly less but has benefited from great injustices. The lower 
polluter may even be able to pollute less precisely because of those injustices – maybe 
they have spent their Nazi gold on wind turbines. 
The obvious reply here is that principles for assigning the costs of climate change 
are not intended to resolve all injustices. Other principles do that. Two responses come to 
mind.  
The first response concerns the coherence of Caney’s position. Between 
introducing ATP and settling on ATP** Caney considers ATP*, which assigns climate 
change costs on the basis of levels of wealth and origins of wealth, with those whose 
wealth was generated in climate-endangering ways taking on more costs. Caney rejects 
this ATP* in favour of ATP**, which also assigns climate change costs on the basis of 
levels of wealth and origins of wealth, but with those whose wealth was generated in 
unjust ways taking on more costs. This is a good move to make, as there is no moral 
difference between a climate-endangering injustice and a non-climate endangering 
injustice of similar magnitude. But it undermines the suggestion that principles for 
assigning the costs of climate-induced harm can not be expected to address justice more 
generally.9 Furthermore, while it is true that PPP* makes some allowance for wider 
distributive justice considerations, as it exempts the poor, wider distributive justice 
concerns are only partially accommodated, as above the poverty threshold all that matters 
is one’s responsibility for pollution, not one’s responsibility for injustice. This asymmetry 
in the structure of ATP** and PPP* does not appear to have a justification. 
                                                 
9 Cf. Caney’s (2005, 763) suggestion that ‘an adequate account of people’s environmental responsibilities 
cannot be derived in isolation from an understanding of their ‘economic’ rights and duties’. 
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The second response is that it is hard to see how other principles could fill in in 
the required way here. Suppose we have a principle that restores Nazi gold (or its value) 
to the (saintly) descendents of its rightful owners at the cost of those who have 
illegitimately claimed it. If the gold is still extant, all well and good, and if it is not extant 
but we can take its value from the bank accounts of the illegitimate beneficiaries that is 
just as good. But what if the only way to restore the full value of the gold to its rightful 
owners is to transfer their pollution-induced liability to the illegitimate beneficiary? What 
if this clean tyrant will knock down the wind turbines he erected if anyone tries to take 
them from him, but will begrudgingly pay the carbon costs of the wronged descendents, 
if only the state will issue him with an invoice? It seems that PPP*, by insisting that the 
carbon costs of the wealthy are paid by polluters alone, will militate against this 
corrective principle, and stand in the way of justice.  
Of course, we could state that PPP* gives way to other principles of justice in 
cases such as this, but to make these other principles the first port of call even on question 
of climate justice restricts principles of climate justice considerably. Surely we should 
want our principles of climate justice to be sufficient to answer the question ‘is this 
allocation of the burdens of climate change just?’. As the answer here is ‘we can’t tell 
until we consult this other corrective principle’, I would suggest that that corrective 
principle must be a further principle of climate change justice that Caney’s account 
overlooks. 
In reply Caney has suggested that I must ‘assume that [PPP*] would reject a 
scenario in which their [the saint’s] ‘climate debt’, so to speak, is paid off by the man 
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who illegitimately has some of their money’.10 And he points out, fairly, that PPP* just 
says that (non-poor) persons should ‘bear the burden of climate change they have 
caused’, which need not take the form of lowering their own greenhouse gas emissions, 
and may take the form of emissions trading or other transactions. 
I do not feel that this succeeds in addressing the objection. The problem was not 
that PPP* would prevent the tyrant from paying off the saint’s climate debt. Rather, the 
problem is that PPP* does not insist on the saint’s debt being paid off in that way. PPP* 
only assigns duties to polluters, not to persons who are unjustly wealthy, so whether the 
tyrant pays off the saint’s climate debt is up to the tyrant. While, in my view, it is an 
advantage of PPP* that it allows emissions trading and other measures that allow the 
burden of tackling climate change to be allocated efficiently, this endorsement of 
voluntary exchanges does nothing to correct a situation in which one person unjustly 
refuses to pay another’s climate change abatement costs until the state requires him to do 
so. 
 
5. The license to pollute 
PPP* is ‘poverty-sensitive’ in that people below a certain level of wealth do not have to 
pay for their pollution (218). In this way PPP* is a partially ‘sufficientarian’ view – it 
says that the poor are entitled to special assistance to bring them up to a sufficient level of 
advantage.11 A number of objections have been raised against sufficientarianism. One 
troubling issue is, as Richard Arneson puts it, that ‘the underlying considerations we care 
about seem ineluctably scalar, so one would think fundamental moral principle should 
                                                 
10 Personal communication. 
11 An important early discussion of sufficientarianism is Frankfurt 1987. 
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reflect this underlying moral fact’.12 PPP* insists that there is some level of poverty at 
which persons are entitled to full relief from the cost of their pollution but marginally 
above which they must bear the full cost of their pollution. It is hard to justify such small 
differences in wealth making such huge differences in obligations.  
There is a further objection raised against sufficientarian views that is especially 
important when considering PPP*. In general, sufficientarianism has the implication that 
those who are below the threshold are not obligated to meet the costs of the choices for 
which they are responsible. While this seems plausible to many people in cases of urgent 
need (for example, where an alcoholic needs a liver transplant), PPP* appears to be 
committed to a form of ‘responsibility insensitivity’ that is not widely accepted. It says 
that the poor have no duty to bear the costs of climate change, even for that part of 
climate change they have caused, if it improves their condition at all. This is to give the 
poor a license to pollute. Suppose a poor person has access to clean energy, but meets his 
heating needs with marginally cheaper but vastly more polluting coal. Surely, if we are 
concerned by global warming, we should be concerned with discouraging such 
behaviour? As Caney himself puts it, ‘[w]e should not take pollution as a given and then 
act in a reactive fashion: rather, we should be pro-active and take steps to minimize the 
likelihood of excessive pollution’.13 Merely reacting to the poor’s pollution rather than 
deterring it is bad for the climate and has no justification from justice. 
It may seem that I misinterpret Caney here. He says, after all, ‘that if one holds, as 
I do, that people should not fall beneath a certain standard of living then the Polluter Pays 
                                                 
12 Arneson 2010. 
13 Caney 2005, 769. 
 11 
Principle should be qualified to prevent it being the case that people are made to pay for 
emissions needed for their fundamental survival’ (213). So it may be suggested that 
Caney would only allow the poor to forgo the environmental cost of their pollution if it 
was essential for their survival. But I think that Caney intends the exemption to be much 
broader. Elsewhere, including in the formal statement of PPP* (218), the ‘fundamental 
survival’ condition for exemption is replaced with a much less strict ‘decent standard of 
living’ condition. This exemption is supported with the thought that ‘the standard of 
living in China is much lower than the USA’ (213). The fact that Caney describes his 
principle as ‘poverty-sensitive’ rather than, say, ‘survival-sensitive’, also suggests that he 
has in mind a principle that would exempt the majority of the Chinese population given 
that they are much poorer than most Americans. It seems, then, that PPP* would exempt 
poor people from paying for pollution that makes their lives slightly better, even if it will 
make the lives of other people – including equally poor people – much worse. This 
approach to giving the poor special treatment is wrong because it only considers one side 
of the equation: it minimizes their duties to bear costs, but ignores the fact that this 
undermines the rights of all, and especially the poor, to be protected from climate change. 
Though ATP** ensures that the wealthy are obliged to cover the cost of emissions 
generated by the poor, it is surely undesirable to increase the overall amount of emissions 
that have to be met in this way, especially as some emissions may have effects that are 
beyond the capacity of the rich to abate. 
 Now it is true that, in some places, Caney does seem to want to assign duties to 
the poor. He says that ‘it is worth noting that although I have argued that the most 
advantaged have a leading responsibility to play, my argument also places duties on the 
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least advantaged as well. For if they can develop in ways that do not involve high levels 
of fossil fuel combustion, and can do so without great cost to themselves, then it would 
be wrong for them to pursue a high emissions policy’ (220). The way that the argument is 
supposed to place duties on the disadvantaged is by ensuring that the worst off have the 
‘ability to attain a decent standard of living’ (213, my emphasis). In correspondence 
Caney notes that this ‘builds in a kind of responsibility-sensitivity’, and clarifies that 
‘[t]he core idea’ is that ‘[p]ersons are allocated those emissions needed to grant them the 
“ability” to attain a decent standard of living and persons are then responsible for how 
they use these emissions’. As he puts it elsewhere: ‘Each person is entitled to that level of 
emissions required for them to attain a minimal decent standard of living’.14 
I have two comments on this line of response. First, there is strong textual 
evidence to suggest that Caney’s concern is with ensuring the poor have a decent 
minimum of living, not only with ensuring that they have the ability to achieve this 
minimum. The main statement of PPP* does not mention the poor’s ability or any similar 
notion, but is rather concerned with ‘not pushing them beneath a decent standard of 
living’ (218). And in explaining the rationale for PPP*, Caney says that ‘if one holds, as I 
do, that people should not fall beneath a certain standard of living then the Polluter Pays 
Principle should be qualified’ (213). So while Caney now holds that the poor’s ability to 
achieve a decent minimum is what matters, this is at odds with at least some of what he 
has written. In particular, it constitutes a substantive revision of PPP*. 
 Second, while the ‘ability’ response does indeed introduce an element of 
responsibility sensitivity, it does not do so in a way that fully addresses the problem of 
                                                 
14 Caney 2009, 213. 
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the polluting poor. To take the earlier example, suppose that the difference in price 
between coal and clean energy, small as it is, is the difference between a decent minimum 
being achievable and a decent minimum being impossible. In that case, even a revised, 
ability-focused version of PPP* would have to allow the poor to choose the much more 
polluting option without facing any penalty, as without coal the poor cannot achieve the 
decent minimum. While we should, of course, have special concern for the poor, there is 
surely some limit to the amount of emissions they should be allowed to emit without 
penalty, even if those emissions are necessary for them to have the ability to achieve a 
decent standard of living.  
  
6. A Pluralistic Approach 
The hybrid view has a problem with disadvantage: it disadvantages some polluters in 
spite of their already difficult circumstances; it disadvantages others in spite of their 
overall contribution to justice; and it allows the disadvantaged poor to pollute with 
impunity. 
In spite of the above criticism, I believe that Caney is correct to favour a view that 
draws on several opposed moral considerations when assigning the costs of climate 
change. Indeed, I believe that, in focusing on responsibility and in giving the worst off 
special attention, he has captured much of what justice has to capture. He has, on my 
view, gone astray mostly in his interpretation of what these considerations require of our 
principles of justice, but his general approach correctly identifies a fundamental pluralism 
of moral values. I will now describe my preferred form of pluralism about justice and its 
application to climate change costs.  
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Utilitarians are wrong to suggest that justice, properly construed, can be reduced 
to promoting utility.15 But there is also more to justice than the view that we should 
solely be concerned with making the worst off fare as well as they can,16 or the luck 
egalitarian view that we should focus on making distributions reflect individual choices.17 
I suggest, however, that these three approaches to justice – that is, utilitarian justice, 
Rawlsian justice, and luck egalitarian justice – taken together constitute an appealing 
account of distributive justice. In other words, my suggestion is that a distribution is 
better, the more it (1) increases overall levels of advantage, (2) increases the levels of 
advantage of the worst off, and (3) increases the extent to which levels of advantage 
correspond to responsible action, in the sense that, the more (morally or prudentially) 
praiseworthy a choice is, the greater are the benefits associated with it. 
 I have defended this view, which I call the pluralistic account, at greater length 
elsewhere.18 Here I want to focus on its advantages as an approach to assigning the costs 
of climate change, especially relative to Caney’s position. On the pluralistic account, any 
given cost of climate change is to be allocated in that way which best promotes advantage 
levels, with increases in the advantage levels of the worst off and those who have made 
better choices being more valuable than increases in the advantage levels of the better off 
and those who have made worse choices. The main advantage this account has relative to 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Mill 1991. Of course, some other utilitarians, both classical and contemporary, do not see their 
enterprise as concerned with justice at all. 
16 This is Rawls’ difference principle, which Rawls (1999) himself combines with other principles. 
17 See Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989. 
18 Knight 2008; Knight 2009. My position draws on Richard Arneson’s recent work, starting with Arneson 
1999. 
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Caney’s hybrid view is the fact that it offers a closer fit with the relevant moral 
considerations.  
 
7. Three objections revisited 
I will now explain why the pluralistic account is not subject to the three objections I have 
advanced against the hybrid view. 
The disadvantaged polluter revisited. The pluralistic account recognizes that it is 
unfair to make people in cold countries pay the full carbon cost of heating themselves 
because that makes them disadvantaged through no fault of their own relative to people in 
temperate countries, who can be warm at a low carbon cost without having to go through 
the expense and upheaval of relocation. Part of the burden of disadvantaged polluters 
should be passed on to the rest of the global population on account of the pluralistic 
account’s concern with making distributions reflect praiseworthiness, rather than where 
people happen to be born. But it recognizes that, given utilitarian concerns with 
efficiency and greater disadvantages held by others, it may be appropriate for 
disadvantaged polluters to pay some of their excess carbon costs. That is, disadvantaged 
polluters should be given some incentive to seek less polluting lifestyles, which dovetails 
with the fact that the globally most disadvantaged can not usually be expected to pick up 
a share of the disadvantaged polluters’ tab. The pluralistic account also generally 
recognizes the significant moral difference between victims of circumstance, who have to 
pollute to secure an adequate level of well-being, and indulgent consumers of polluting 
luxuries, treating the first group as more praiseworthy and less advantaged and thus 
entitled to greater assistance. 
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The disadvantaged saint revisited. The pluralistic account is obviously not subject 
to the objection that it would treat the clean tyrant better than the polluting saint. It does 
not distinguish between climate injustice and other injustices, and would recognize the 
saint as in possession of a lower level of advantage than that to which he is entitled, given 
the character of his choices, while the reverse is true of the tyrant.  
The license to pollute revisited. The pluralistic account is not committed to any 
cut-off point, beyond which people are considered so poor that they cannot be given 
significant duties. It has the means to impose the necessary penalties on polluting activity 
among the poor on account of both the utilitarian and luck egalitarian strands of the view. 
Someone who increases carbon emissions decreases overall levels of advantage and in so 
doing becomes less praiseworthy, so there is both a direct (responsibility-based) and 
indirect (utilitarian incentive-based) argument for decreasing their level of advantage. 
This is to be balanced against the Rawlsian case for increasing the poor’s level of 
advantage. In some cases, making the poor pay for their pollution – for instance, through 
a tax on coal fires – will improve the overall position of the worst off as the cost of the 
duties they are thereby under is outweighed by increased protection of their rights against 
being harmed by climate change. The pluralistic approach reflects the fact that justice has 
a special concern for the poor, but it does not interpret that as giving them carte blanche 
to pollute.  
 
8. Conclusion 
I conclude that the pluralistic account provides a more compelling account of assigning 
the costs associated with climate change than does Caney’s hybrid model. The pluralistic 
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account (1) acknowledges that some emissions are less objectionable than others, (2) 
consistently takes the best position that, in assigning costs, all-things-considered justice is 
what matters, and (3) assigns duties to meet climate change costs to the poor, preventing 
avoidable pollution. 
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